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OFFICE OF PETITIONS

In re Application of

- Edward Magid

Application No. 10/705,621

Filed: November 10, 2003 Attorney Docket No.: P662 **DECISION ON PETITION**

This is a decision on the petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a), filed November 22, 2004, to revive the above-identified application.

The petition is **DISMISSED**.

Any request for reconsideration of this decision must be submitted within TWO (2) MONTHS from the mail date of this decision. Extensions of time under 37 CFR 1.136(a) are permitted. The reconsideration request should include a cover letter entitled "Renewed Petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a)" or "Renewed Petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b)." This is not a final agency decision.

The application became abandoned on October 14, 2004, for failure to timely submit the issue fee as required by the Notice of Allowance and Issue Fee Due mailed July 13, 2004, which set a three (3) month statutory period for reply. Petitioner filed an Issue Fee Transmittal on October 14, 2004 (certificate of mailing October 11, 2004) with a check in the amount of \$985.00, for the amount of the issue fee and publication fee. When the USPTO attempted to collect the funds, the check was returned by the bank it was drawn on as insufficient funds were in the account to satisfy the disbursement. As the issue fee was not timely paid, the application became abandoned. Accordingly, a Notice of Abandonment was mailed November 12, 2004.

In response, the present petition was filed accompanied by the petition fee, issue fee, and publication fee. Petitioner asserts that the check was drawn on an American Express business account and that he did not present the check to the USPTO until after he'd verified that the funds were available but that the delay occurred because for some unexpected and unexplained reason, American Express would not honor the check upon presentation.

A grantable petition to revive an abandoned application under 37 CFR 1.137(a) must be

accompanied by:

A

- (1) the required reply, unless previously filed. In a nonprovisional application abandoned for failure to prosecute, the required reply may be met by the filing of a continuing application. In a nonprovisional application filed on or after June 8, 1995, and abandoned for failure to prosecute, the required reply may also be met by the filing of a request for continued examination in compliance with § 1.114. In an application or patent, abandoned or lapsed for failure to pay the issue fee or any portion thereof, the required reply must be the payment of the issue fee or any outstanding balance thereof;
- (2) the petition fee as set forth in § 1.17(l);
- (3) a showing to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to this paragraph was unavoidable; and
- (4) any terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in § 1.20(d)) required pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section.

This petition lacks items (3) above.

SHOWING OF UNAVOIDABLE DELAY

Decisions on reviving abandoned applications on the basis of "unavoidable" delay have adopted the reasonably prudent person standard in determining if the delay was -unavoidable:

The word 'unavoidable' . . . is applicable to ordinary human affairs, and requires no more or greater care or diligence than is generally used and observed by prudent and careful men in relation to their most important business. It permits them in the exercise of this care to rely upon the ordinary and trustworthy agencies of mail and telegraph, worthy and reliable employees, and such other means and instrumentalities as are usually employed in such important business. If unexpectedly, or through the unforeseen fault or imperfection of these agencies and instrumentalities, there occurs a failure, it may properly be said to be unavoidable, all other conditions of promptness in its rectification being present.¹

ln re Mattullath, 38 App. D.C. 497, 514-15 (1912)(quoting Exparte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31, 32-33 (1887)); see also Winkler v. Ladd, 221 F. Supp. 550, 552, 138 USPQ 666, 167-68 (D.D.C. 1963), affd, 143 USPQ 172 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Exparte Henrich, 1913 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 139, 141 (1913). In addition, decisions on revival are made on a "case-by-case basis, taking all the facts and circumstances into account." Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 USPQ 977, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Finally, a petition cannot be granted where a petitioner has failed to meet his or her burden of establishing that the delay was "unavoidable." Haines v. Quigg, 673 F. Supp. 314, 316-17, 5 USPQ2d 1130, 1131-32 (N.D. Ind. 1987).

The showing of record is inadequate to establish unavoidable delay within the meaning of 37 CFR 1.137(a). Specifically, an application is "unavoidably" abandoned only where petitioner, or counsel for petitioner, takes all action necessary for a proper response to the outstanding Office action, but through the intervention of unforeseen circumstances, such as failure or mail, telegraph, telefacsimile, or the negligence of otherwise reliable employees, the response is not timely received in the Office.²

The showing of record is that the delay in payment of the issue fee occurred because there was insufficient funds in the account the check used to pay the fees was drawn on. As it was petitioner's responsibility to ensure that the account contained sufficient funds, in spite of his efforts to make that assurance, the account was insufficient nonetheless and petitioner has not presented an acceptable explanation for the deficiency.

Petitioner has not established that the delay was unavoidable. Rather than unavoidable delay, the record indicates a lack of diligence on the part of petitioner in maintaining an adequate balance in his business account with American Express. In order to establish unavoidable delay, petitioner must demonstrate diligence in prosecution of the matter,³ and the record does not establish that petitioner took all action necessary for prosecution of this application in satisfaction of 37 CFR 1.137(a). If such were the case, petitioner should have at least provided a statement from American Express that it was their error that caused the check not to have been honored or in the alternative, petitioner should have had back-up perhaps in the form of a deposit account or overdraft protection. The showing presented is insufficient to establish unavoidable delay within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 133 and 37 CFR 1.137(a). As petitioner has presented no showing of unavoidable delay, the petition will be dismissed.

ALTERNATIVE VENUE

Petitioner may wish to consider filing a renewed petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b)4,

²Ex parte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31 (Comm'r Pat. 1887).

³<u>See Douglas v. Manbeck,</u> 21 USPQ2d 1697, 1700 (E.D. Pa. 1991), <u>aff'd</u> 975 F.2d 869, 24 USPQ2d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

⁴Effective December 1, 1997, the provisions of 37 CFR 1.137(b) now provide that where the delay in reply was unintentional, a petition may be filed to revive an abandoned application or a lapsed patent pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b). A grantable petition filed under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.137(b) <u>must</u> be accompanied by:

⁽¹⁾ the required reply, unless previously filed. In a nonprovisional application abandoned for failure to prosecute, the required reply may be met by the filing of a continuing application. In an application or patent, abandoned or lapsed for failure to pay the issuefee or any portion thereof, the required reply must be the payment of the issuefee or any outstanding balance thereof.

which now provides that where the delay in reply was unintentional, a petition may be filed to revive an abandoned application or a lapsed patent pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b).

The filing of a petition under the unintentional standard cannot be intentionally delayed and therefore should be filed promptly. A person seeking revival due to unintentional delay cannot make a statement that the delay was unintentional unless the entire delay, including the delay from the date it was discovered that the application was abandoned until the filing of the petition to revive under 37 CFR 1.137(b), was unintentional. A statement that the delay was unintentional is not appropriate if petitioner intentionally delayed the filing of a petition for revival under 37 CFR 1.137(b).

Further correspondence with respect to this matter should be addressed as follows:

-By mail:

Mail Stop Petitions

Commissioner for Patents

P.O. Box 1450

Alexandria VA 22313-1450

By FAX:

(703)308-6916

Attn: Office of Petitions

Telephone inquiries concerning this matter may be directed to the undersigned

Retitions Attorney at (571) 272-3212.

Patricia Faison-Ball

Senior Petitions Attorney

Office of Petitions

⁽²⁾ the petition fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(m);

⁽³⁾ a statement that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b) was unintentional. The Commissioner may required additional information where there is a question whether the delay was unintentional; and

⁽⁴⁾ any terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.20(d)) required pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(c)).